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INTRODUCTION
It was the middle of the summer, and an eighteen-year-old boy
sat alone in his truck in Fairhaven, Massachusetts, waiting to die.1
In his backseat, a gasoline-powered water pump emitted
dangerous carbon monoxide levels within the confined space of the
vehicle.2 At some point, fear overcame the boy as he realized that
the carbon monoxide was beginning to steal his life.3 He exited the
truck in a panic.4 His girlfriend, who was on the phone with him at
the time, gave him one simple command: “Get back in.”5
The following afternoon, on July 13, 2014, a local police officer
found the dead body of Conrad Roy.6 During the investigation that
ensued in the wake of Roy’s suicide, local law enforcement
reviewed Roy’s electronic communications.7 Their findings caused
officials to more closely examine his relationship with his
girlfriend, seventeen-year-old Michelle Carter.8 The officials
discovered that Carter and Roy met in 2011 and dated at various
times in the three years that followed.9 The majority of
this relationship and contact took place via text messages and
cellphone conversations.10
The content of these electronic communications was of
particular concern to the police.11 While Roy had a history of mental
health issues and attempted suicides, Carter appeared to have
exacerbated her boyfriend’s problems by constantly encouraging
Roy to kill himself.12 For example, in the days leading up to his
death, Carter and Roy had brainstormed ideas for devices that
could produce carbon monoxide.13 Carter had suggested that Roy
“Google ways to make it[,]” and subsequently recommended using

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1056 (Mass. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 1059 n.8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1056–57.
Id. at 1057.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1057 n.4.
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a generator.14 The next day, Carter sent Roy a text promising that
she would stay up with him if he wanted to kill himself that night.15
When Roy responded that he wished to wait, Carter replied, “You
can’t keep pushing it off.”16 Over text, Carter promised to take care
of Roy’s family after his death, and she threatened to get him help
unless Roy went through with his suicide plan.17 She also
recommended that he “go in a quiet parking lot” to kill himself.18
Finally, the morning before Roy committed suicide, Carter sent
increasingly demanding texts to Roy.19 For example, she told him,
“You keep pushing it off and you say you’ll do it but u [sic] never
do. Its [sic] always gonna [sic] be that way if u [sic] don’t take
action . . . . You’re just making it harder on yourself . . . , you just
have to do it . . . .”20
While these messages may seem incriminating, none of these
texts truly convinced Judge Lawrence Moniz to find Carter guilty
of involuntary manslaughter. In a widely publicized decision,21
Judge Moniz explained that Roy was in fact responsible for his own
death in the time period leading up to his suicide.22 Judge Moniz
found that Roy, who struggled with mental health problems, “took
significant actions of his own towards” ending his life.23 These
actions included researching methods of suicide, securing a
generator, obtaining a water pump, placing his truck in an
unnoticeable area, and turning on the pump.24 However, Judge
Moniz stressed that Roy “br[oke] that chain of self-causation by

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 1057 n.3.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1058 nn.5–6.
Id. at 1058 n.6.
Id. at 1057 n.4.
Id.
See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye & Jess Bidgood, Guilty Verdict for
Young Woman Who Urged Friend to Kill Himself, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/suicide-texting-trial-michelle-carter-conradroy.html.
22. Dan
Glaun,
Michelle
Carter
Trial:
Watch
Guilty
Verdict Being Read by Judge Lawrence Moniz, MASSLIVE (June 15, 2017),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2017/06/verdict_reached_in_michelle_ca.htm
l.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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exiting the vehicle. He t[ook] himself out of the toxic environment
that it ha[d] become.”25
It was then that Carter told Roy to return to the truck and finish
the job, even knowing Roy’s history and his fears. At that exact
moment, Judge Moniz reasoned, Carter became responsible for
Roy’s life.26 Judge Moniz found that “instructing Mr. Roy to get
back in the truck constituted . . . wanton and reckless conduct by
Ms. Carter,” which created a situation where it was highly likely
that substantial harm would befall Roy.27
The court found that Carter’s instructions to “get back in” the
truck created the circumstances that threatened Roy’s life.28 The
court held that, therefore, Carter had “a duty to take reasonable
steps to alleviate the risk,” the failure of which can result in a charge
of manslaughter under Massachusetts law.29 Judge Moniz found it
damning that Carter took no such steps, asserting that “[Carter] did
not call the police or Mr. Roy’s family. . . . She called no one. And
finally, she did not issue a simple, additional instruction: Get out of
the truck.”30 Instead, Carter simply listened to the sound of the
motor and to Roy’s coughs as her boyfriend died, obeying her
instructions until his last breath.31 For these reasons, the court
found that, “Carter’s actions, and also her failure to act, where she
had a self-created duty to Mr. Roy since she had put him into that
toxic environment, constituted . . . wanton and reckless conduct”
sufficient for a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.32 In
February of 2019, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed Judge Moniz’s decision without conditions or
reservations.33 Michelle Carter appealed her conviction to the
United States Supreme Court on July 8, 2019, but the certiorari
petition was denied.34
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carter v. Commonwealth, No. 19-62 (U.S. July 8,
2019); see also Doha Madani, Michelle Carter, Who Encouraged Boyfriend’s Suicide, Appeals to
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This Note argues that the Massachusetts court overreached to
criminalize Michelle Carter’s conduct. The court based its decision
solely on her words of encouragement and enticement to commit a
suicide, despite her physical absence and lack of action. It is
possible that the court in Massachusetts reached the correct
outcome for Michelle Carter’s case. But absent legislative guidance
on this issue, the court’s decision to innovate the law of suicide in
Carter exhibited a troubling display of judicial activism and was an
improper means to achieve such a result. If a state like
Massachusetts desires to penalize suicide encouragement,
especially encouragement through electronic communications, this
legal standard should be articulated clearly and carefully by
statute. This would put citizens like Michelle Carter on fair notice
of the criminality of such behavior. It would also more accurately
reflect the will of the people through their elected representatives,
rather than encouraging legislating from the bench.
This Note will proceed as follows: Part I steps back to analyze
the historical and current legal landscape of the criminality of both
assisting and encouraging suicide. This Part delves into the
different categories of culpability within suicide law, concluding
that the guilty verdict in Carter, based on words alone, was an
atypical outcome under the majority of state suicide laws within
the United States. Part II examines the outcome in Michelle Carter’s
specific case, particularly focusing on the court’s reasoning in
reaching its verdict. This examination argues that the court’s
decision, in the absence of statutory guidance, demonstrated
judicial overreaching. Part III finds that the environment
surrounding the issue of encouraging suicide has altered in recent
years, particularly exploring the effects of modern developments in
technology on criminal suicide law. Due to these changes, this Part
argues that updated guidance from legislators is necessary to
reflect these changes. Part IV then explores the potential
ramifications of the Michelle Carter conviction. The argument in
this Part asserts that her conviction will have a major impact on
future actions against those who are charged for words that may
have swayed another’s suicidal thoughts into action. Part V
Supreme Court, NBC NEWS (July 8, 2019), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/michelle-carter-who-encouraged-boyfriend-s-suicide-appeals-supreme-courtn1027601.
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recommends how cases like Carter should be approached as digital
communications and modern technology continue to advance.
Ultimately, this Note contends that the most suitable way to
criminalize suicide encouragement is through clear, carefully
written statutory law that is careful to take evolving technology
into account and to avoid treading on the First Amendment’s
protection of speech.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ENCOURAGING SUICIDE
To better understand the outcome of Michelle Carter’s case, it is
necessary to first examine the historical and modern perspectives
toward those who commit suicide and those who assist the
commission of suicide within the scope of criminal law. The
following discussion will begin by analyzing the history of suicide
in the legal context, followed by an overview of the modern legal
approach to suicide, including an explanation of the laws
governing suicide assistance, suicide pacts, and suicide
encouragement. This landscape of suicide law revealed in the
following discussion will clarify that Carter’s conviction was an
incorrect exercise of judicial activism.
A. A History of Suicide in the Context of Criminal Law
The history of suicide as a punishable action stretches back at
least to the ancient Greek era.35 Speaking on the subject of suicide,
Plato said that “[t]hey who meet their death in this way shall be
buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be
buried ingloriously . . . in such places as are uncultivated and
nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their
interment.”36
Similarly, in England, beginning in the mid-thirteenth century,
suicide was a felony; if a man ended his own life, he was denied a
Christian burial.37 Instead, his body would be dumped in a pit at a
crossroads.38 Further, his family would be deprived of all its

35. See PLATO, LAWS 220 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Prometheus Books 2000) (1892).
36. Id.
37. Gerry Holt, When Suicide Was Illegal, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.

bbc.com/news/magazine-14374296.
38. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425 (1877).
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belongings, which would instead be turned over to the Crown.39
Up until 1961, those in England or Wales were still subject to
criminal prosecution for merely attempting suicide.40
The laws in the United States originally followed this same
societal condemnation of suicide.41 Under the common law, the
commission of suicide was considered “an unlawful act.”42 During
this era, “[i]n the eye of the law, self-destruction . . . [wa]s an
offense,” and any individual committing suicide would be in
violation of the law.43 As such, suicide under common law was
punishable by forfeiture of the offender’s property and an
ignominious burial of the decedent’s body.44 This practice was
similar to the old philosophies and attitudes toward suicide in
Greece and England.45 However, the laws have adjusted as
society’s general attitude toward suicide has softened. While some
jurisdictions in the United States still consider suicide a commonlaw crime,46 no states currently maintain any statute criminalizing
the commission of suicide. The modern view is that suicide is no
longer punishable under American law.47
This raises the central question as to whether the assistance or
encouragement of suicide should remain illegal. It seems
inequitable for courts to punish a defendant who helps a victim

39. See Burnett v. People, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (Ill. 1903) (“By the English common law
suicide was a felony, and the punishment for him who committed it was interment in the
highway with a stake driven through the body, and the forfeiture of his lands, goods, and
chattels to the king.”); see also Mink, 123 Mass. at 425.
40. Holt, supra note 37. In fact, in 1956, 613 failed suicide attempts were prosecuted
under English law. Id. Although most of these individuals were discharged, fined, or put on
probation for their actions, thirty-three of these attempts resulted in imprisonment. Id.
41. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (“[F]or over 700 years, the
Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both
suicide and assisting suicide.”).
42. 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 5 (2017); see also State v. Reese, 633 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. 2006)
overruled on other grounds by State v. Belcher, 685 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 2009).
43. State v. Levelle, 13 S.E. 319, 321 (S.C. 1891).
44. Suicide, supra note 41.
45. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
46. Suicide, supra note 42; see also Hill v. Nicodemus, 755 F. Supp. 692, 693 (W.D.
Va. 1991) (“[A]lthough the state cannot punish a suicide, it in fact remains a common
law crime.”).
47. In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Cal. 1983) (“[P]unishing suicide is contrary to
modern penal and psychological theory.” (quoting VICTOR M. VICTOROFF, THE SUICIDAL
PATIENT: RECOGNITION, INTERVENTION, MANAGEMENT 173–74 (1982))).
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accomplish a perfectly legal act.48 In fact, there is a modern crusade,
known as the Right-to-Die Movement, which actively supports the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide.49 This movement began
in the 1970s.50 Since that time, the issue of whether the terminally
ill should have a right to die peacefully on their own terms has been
intensely debated.51 The majority of states have not adopted laws
permitting any form of assisted-suicide. But the movement reflects
a shift over the last several decades in the overall attitude toward
suicide. Thus far, eight jurisdictions have legalized physicianassisted suicide, with nineteen additional states currently
considering a physician-assisted suicide statute.52
Nevertheless, the taking of one’s life is still highly discouraged
and disapproved of generally throughout the United States. Most
citizens consider the prevention of suicide to be “a legitimate and
compelling interest” because “[t]he preservation of life has a high
social value in our culture and suicide is deemed ‘a grave public
wrong.’”53 Because of this reverence for life and moral aversion to
suicide in American society, the majority of states have elected to
preserve at least some form of liability in suicides—most notably
for those who either assist in or encourage suicide.54

48. See Brittani Ready, Words as Weapons: Electronic Communications That Result in
Suicide and the Uncomfortable Truth with Criminal Culpability Based on Words Alone, 36 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 133 (2017).
49. See Sarah Childress, The Evolution of America’s Right-to-Die Movement, FRONTLINE
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-evolution-of-americasright-to-die-movement/.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Take Action: Death with Dignity Around the U.S., DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/take-action/ (last updated Oct. 10, 2019) [hereinafter
Take Action]. Nine jurisdictions—California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine,
New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—have passed Death with Dignity statutes,
while Montana has legalized physician-assisted suicide by court decision. Id.
53. Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); see also
Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 147 P.2d 227, 229 (Or. 1944) (“[S]elf destruction
ordinarily involves moral turpitude and is undoubtedly regarded as being wrong.”);
Bisenius v. Karns, 165 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Wis. 1969) (“There is in the law no sanction for selfdestruction . . . .”).
54. See generally 96 Am. L. Rep. 6th 475 (2014); see also ROBERT RIVAS, FINAL EXIT
NETWORK, INC., SURVEY OF STATE LAWS AGAINST ASSISTING IN A SUICIDE (2017),
http://www.finalexitnetwork.org/Survey_of_State_Laws_Against_Assisting_in_a_Suicide
_2017_update.pdf.
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B. The Modern Approach to Suicide-Related Crimes
In the context of those who influence the commission of a
suicide, it is difficult to draw a line between innocent and culpable
conduct.55 “The boundaries between general advocacy for the right
to suicide, encouraging suicide, and assisting suicide are extremely
blurred, and conduct often does not fit neatly into just one
category.”56 The following discussion will focus on potential
classifications that suicide-related behaviors may fall into,
including the encouragement of suicide.
1. Assisting suicide
The United States Supreme Court has held that “the asserted
‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental
liberty interest” under the Constitution.57 Thus, it is left to the states
to decide whether to permit or prohibit an individual from assisting
someone who wishes to die. On the whole, although there is
dissonance as to what exactly qualifies as criminal “assistance,”
most state laws explicitly forbid the act of assisting another
individual in the commission of suicide.58
a. Causing the suicide. Of all offenses pertaining to a person who
has involved herself in another’s suicide, the highest degree of
culpability lies with those who are found to have caused the suicide.
The principal drafter of the Model Penal Code, Professor Herbert
Wechsler, viewed the notion of causing suicide as “a pretty clever
way to commit murder.”59 In fact, the Model Penal Code provides
that “[a] person may be convicted of criminal homicide for causing

55. See Sean Sweeney, Note, Deadly Speech: Encouraging Suicide and Problematic
Prosecutions, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 941, 948 (2017).
56. Id.
57. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (“The history of the law’s
treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection
of nearly all efforts to permit it.”).
58. 96 Am. L. Rep. 6th 475 (2014). Forty states currently have assisted-suicide laws,
although it is important to note, for purposes of this Note, that Massachusetts does not have
any current legislation prohibiting the assistance or encouragement of suicide. See Susan
Zalkind, Is Telling Someone to Commit Suicide a Crime?, VICE (Sep. 2, 2015), https://www.
vice.com/en_us/article/wd7gx5/is-telling-someone-to-commit-suicide-a-crime-902.
59. Catherine D. Shaffer, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348,
364 (1986) (quoting Continuation of Discussion of Model Penal Code, 36 A.L.I. PROC. 137 (1959)).
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another to commit suicide . . . if he purposely causes such suicide
by force, duress or deception.”60
There are many cases where a defendant is charged with
murder after physically killing the suicidal victim at the request of
the decedent.61 But the law does not necessarily require that the
defendant commit the actual act in order to find that the defendant
is guilty as the cause of the suicide. In State v. Lassiter,62 the victim
worked as a prostitute for the defendant who had physically
abused her on multiple occasions.63 During one such incident, the
defendant savagely beat the victim, despite her screams for help.64
Eventually, she cried out that “she was going to jump,” because she
could not take any more abuse.65 The defendant allegedly told her
to “go ahead and jump.”66 The victim responded by throwing
herself out the window of the apartment building, falling to
her death.67
The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of murder.68 The
court found that the victim’s response to the defendant’s actions
was reasonably foreseeable, and that the defendant was certainly
the but-for cause of the victim’s death.69 “[I]n [the victim’s] despair
and pain the only visible choices were between being beaten to
death and a swifter, more merciful demise at her own hands.”70 The
court also found that the defendant’s actions constituted causing
suicide, rather than the less culpable offense of aiding suicide: the
victim’s suicide “was provoked entirely by abuse and coercion on
the part of the defendant,” and was not the result of a “suicidal plan
originated with the victim.”71

60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
61. See, e.g., People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505, 507–08, 513 (Cal. 1959) (holding that the

evidence strongly supported that the defendant was guilty of second degree murder where
the defendant strangled a man to death allegedly at the decedent’s request, but remanding
for a new trial on other grounds).
62. See generally State v. Lassiter, 484 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
63. Id. at 15–16.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 18–19.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id.
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(1) Causation based on non-physical influence. This Note
focuses more on the potential criminality of causing suicide
through words or psychological distress, as the court in Carter
found that Michelle Carter did, rather than causing suicide through
physical force or duress.
In theory, it is possible for causation of suicide to be established
based on such psychological harm. One of the closest cases to this
kind of causation is Kimberlin v. DeLong.72 In this case, the defendant
placed a homemade explosive device in an abandoned gym bag.73
The explosive detonated and severely injured a man walking by,
resulting in the amputation of his leg.74 Over time, the victim
became depressed and, more than four years after the explosion,
committed suicide.75 Despite the fact that it had been years since the
defendant’s criminal act, the court held that the suicide was not an
intervening cause.76 The defendant remained liable for the
wrongful death of the victim.77 Specifically, the court found that a
defendant may be held responsible for any injury or death resulting
from a suicide or suicide attempt “where a defendant’s willful
tortious conduct was intended to cause a victim physical harm and
where the intentional tort is a substantial factor in bringing about
the suicide.”78
Thus, Kimberlin illustrates that a defendant who is responsible
for substantial psychological distress to a victim can be the cause of
that victim’s suicide. However, Kimberlin also indicates that some
physical action, like the bombing, is likely still needed to reach this
conclusion. In fact, many similar suicide cases illustrate that mere
psychological compulsion of a victim to commit suicide, without
more, does not qualify as causation.79 For instance, in Turcios v.
Debruler Co., the defendant forced the victim and the victim’s family
out of their apartment and demolished the building.80 The court
found that the resulting suicide was not foreseeable as a likely

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See generally Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1994).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 123, 128.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Turcios v. Debruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1128 (Ill. 2015).
Id. at 1121, 1128.
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result of the eviction, because “suicide may result from a complex
combination of psychological, psychiatric, chemical, emotional,
and environmental factors.”81 Overall, it is a “rare case in which the
decedent’s suicide would not break the chain of causation,” even
under circumstances where a defendant causes severe emotional or
psychological distress.82
Additionally, the aforementioned cases were civil claims,
demonstrating that causing psychological distress which results in
a suicide is not generally criminally punishable. Courts are not
likely to establish that a defendant has caused a suicide without
some element of physical coercion or actual action on the part of
the defendant.
b. Active facilitation of the suicide. Physically assisting a suicide
can result in a criminal conviction, depending on the jurisdiction.
Criminal assistance charges range from actions as involved as
strangling a victim to death at the victim’s own request,83 to more
trivial forms of help, such as addressing the envelopes for the
victim’s suicide notes.84
Many courts have also found it to be a crime when the
defendant simply provided the means for a victim to commit
suicide.85 On the other hand, some courts have reached the opposite
conclusion.86 For example, one defendant in Michigan encouraged
a suicidal acquaintance to purchase a gun, drove the victim to
retrieve a weapon and shells from another home, and then left the
victim alone with the gun to kill himself.87 The court found that “the
81. Id. at 1128.
82. Id. In Turcios, it is also significant that the victim’s psychological distress resulted

from the defendant’s physical action of demolishing the victim’s home, which was still not
enough to establish causation of the suicide. Id.
83. See People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1959).
84. A grand jury in Texas indicted a teenage girl for aiding her boyfriend’s suicide
simply because she addressed the envelopes for his suicide notes. AP, Texan Accused of
Aiding Boyfriend’s Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/
11/27/us/texan-accused-of-aiding-boyfriend-s-suicide.html.
85. See State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 583 (Iowa 1980) (holding that “preparing and
providing a weapon for one who is unable to do so and is known to be intoxicated and
probably suicidal” constitute actions that support the defendant’s conviction of involuntary
manslaughter); see also State v. Bier, 591 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Mont. 1979) (affirming a judgment
of negligent homicide for a defendant’s wife’s suicide, where the defendant “threw [a]
cocked, loaded firearm within reach of his intoxicated wife, challenged her to use it, and
allowed her to take the gun off the bed”).
86. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
87. Id. at 28–29.
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conduct of the defendant [was] morally reprehensible,” but, even
with the additional action of providing the suicide victim with a
weapon, inciting someone to commit suicide was not in itself
a crime.88
c. Passive assistance of the suicide. In theory, a defendant can be
convicted for assisting a suicide after simply standing by and
failing to prevent it.89 This is particularly true where the defendant
owes the victim a special duty, such as in a spousal relationship.90
However, this seems to be a predominately hypothetical view on
suicide liability. More relevant for purposes of this Note is that
mere verbal communication can establish criminal liability for
passive suicidal assistance, so long as those words offer
material assistance specific to the suicide in question.91 Minnesota
in particular has dealt with this issue. Its courts have
interpreted statutory criminal assistance of suicide to include
“either physical conduct or words . . . specifically directed at [the
victim],” so long as “the conduct or words enabled [the victim] to
take her own life.”92 In fact, a Minnesota defendant was recently
found guilty of assisting a suicide after providing detailed
instructions for a particular method of hanging oneself to a suicidal
internet correspondent.93
d. Physician-assisted suicide. One topic that has gained particular
prevalence and notoriety in the media and within the field of law is
that of physician-assisted suicide. Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the
pathologist also known as “Dr. Death,”94 was perhaps the most
famous influence behind the movement endorsing the right for the

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 31.
Shaffer, supra note 59, at 358–59.
Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has found that speech that goes “beyond merely
expressing a moral viewpoint or providing a general comfort or support” for suicide and
instead “enabl[es] the person to commit suicide” qualifies as criminal assistance of suicide.
State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014); see also infra Section III.A.3.
92. State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296, 304 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016)
(holding that the district court’s jury instructions were proper when the instructions defined
the assisting of suicide to include words) (emphasis added); see also Melchert-Dinkel, 844
N.W.2d at 23.
93. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. A15-0073, 2015 WL 9437531, at *5–9 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 28, 2015).
94. Dominic Rushe, ‘Dr Death’ Jack Kevorkian, Advocate of Assisted Suicide, Dies in
Hospital, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/04/
dr-death-jack-kevorkian-suicide.
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terminally ill to plan their own suicides through medical means. Dr.
Kevorkian built a machine, which he operated out of a Volkswagen
van, that injected a lethal dose of medication to those who wished
to die.95 He helped end the lives of approximately 130 ill patients.96
After broadcasting one such death on 60 Minutes, one of the most
popular programs on American television, Dr. Kevorkian was
convicted of second-degree murder and spent eight years
in prison.97
While Dr. Kevorkian’s story and methods were controversial,98
his actions sparked a national debate about what kind of death
suffering humans are entitled to receive. In the last twenty years,
nine states, as well as the District of Columbia, have approved of
physician-assisted suicide through either statutory law or court
decision.99 There are also nineteen additional states currently
considering such a statute.100 The vast majority of jurisdictions still
hold all forms of assisted suicide to be illegal. But the ongoing
physician-assisted suicide debate reflects a modern shift in
attitudes toward suicide,101 as well as toward those who aid
suffering individuals with a legitimate desire to initiate their
own deaths.
2. Suicide pacts
Another area of suicide law revolves around the curious
phenomenon of the suicide pact, defined as a mutual agreement

95. Id.
96. Keith Schneider, Dr. Jack Kevorkian Dies at 83; A Doctor Who Helped End Lives, N.Y.

TIMES (June 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04kevorkian.html.
97. Rushe, supra note 94.
98. For instance, the American Medical Association publicly labeled Jack Kevorkian
“a reckless instrument of death,” who “pervert[ed] the idea of the caring and committed
physician,” and whose ideologies and actions “pose[d] a great threat to the public.”
Kevorkian v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 602 N.W. 233, 235 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
99. See Take Action, supra note 52. Apart from the District of Columbia, the nine U.S.
jurisdictions that have enacted Death with Dignity laws through statute or by court decision
include California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington. Id.
100. Id. The following states are considering the enactment of a Death with Dignity law
this year or session: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
101. See generally supra Section I.A.
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among two or more people to commit suicide together.102
Participating in a suicide pact creates a tricky question of
culpability in the United States. In part, such participation is
suicide, which is not illegal; nevertheless, the participation is also
partially assisting suicide, which many jurisdictions deem
criminal.103 Thus, the defendant seems both simultaneously guilty
as a potential cause of suicide, and innocent as a potential victim
of suicide.
Under traditional common law, a survivor of a suicide pact was
held to be guilty of murder.104 However, the modern trend
recognizes that criminal punishment does not offer solutions for
those in the frame of mind to attempt suicide.105 Some jurisdictions
have abolished liability entirely for survivors of suicide pacts.106
Others have elected to lessen the criminal culpability for
participants in suicide pacts “in which one party provides the
means but each individual kills himself independently pursuant to
the agreement, or where the pact envisions both parties killing
themselves simultaneously with a single instrumentality,” finding
the survivors liable as mere aiders and abettors to the suicide.107
3. Encouraging suicide
This final category presents the overarching question that
resides at the heart of this Note—whether the mere encouragement
of suicide is illegal. For purposes of this Note, “encouraging”

102. Suicide Pact, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
103. See Diana M. Keating, Existence of a Suicide Pact as a Complete Defense to a Survivor’s

Criminal Liability, 21 AKRON L. REV. 245, 250 (1987).
104. 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 14 (2018).
105. See David S. Markson, The Punishment of Suicide—A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L.
REV. 463, 473 (1969) (“All modern research points to one conclusion about the problem of
suicide—the irrelevance of the criminal law to its solution.”).
106. See State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 345–48 (Ohio 1987) (finding that “if the trier of
fact believe[s] defendant’s version of the facts . . . [t]he assertion that a death was the result
of a mutual suicide pact is a complete defense to any crime by the survivor to the pact”
(emphasis added)).
107. 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 14 (2018); see also In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176 (Cal. 1983). In this
case, a sixteen-year-old and his friend agreed to drive off a cliff together in an attempt to kill
themselves. Id. at 1177. While the passenger died, the driver of the car survived with severe
injuries. Id. at 1177–78. The court found that the survivor was only guilty under the felony of
aiding suicide, and not under the traditional charge of murder associated with suicide pacts,
because both the victim and the survivor had “commit[ted] their suicidal acts simultaneously
and were subject to identical risks of death.” Id. at 1182–83.
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suicide pertains to verbal or written statements made with the
intent to persuade or embolden another individual to commit
suicide.108 There are jurisdictions that specifically criminalize the
encouragement of suicide.109 However, those states are relatively
few in number, and “many states have moved away from broad
prohibitions on ‘encouraging’ or ‘advising’ someone to commit
suicide and now explicitly require some physical act beyond
pure speech.”110
Overall, the vast majority of jurisdictions are uncomfortable
with actually prosecuting the encouragement of suicide.111 The
modern trend is that, in most cases, courts generally look for some
form of assistance to accompany the defendant’s encouragement of
the suicide in order to convict that individual.112 This is perhaps
why Michelle Carter’s story is of such particular fascination to
the public. Carter’s case exhibits a conviction based on a
seemingly archaic and outdated rule—guilt for mere suicide
encouragement—which resulted from the use of very modern
technology—Carter’s mobile phone.
II. MICHELLE CARTER’S CURIOUS VERDICT
This Part examines how the assistance or encouragement of
suicide fits within the scope of Massachusetts criminal law. The
discussion then moves on to examine the court’s reasoning in
Michelle Carter’s case. It concludes that in the absence of statutory
guidance the court overstepped its boundaries by finding Michelle
Carter guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
108. See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014) (finding that “the
common definitions of ‘advise’ and ‘encourage’ broadly include speech that provides
support or rallies courage”).
109. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2010); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (2016); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 813 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2216-37 (2006). These statutes are all similarly worded, broadly making it a crime to in any way
“advise” or “encourage” another to commit suicide.
110. Ready, supra note 48, at 130.
111. This is evidenced by the fact that only five states have enacted statutes prohibiting
suicide encouragement. See Markson, supra note 109.
112. See Assisted Suicide Laws in the United States, PATIENTS RIGHTS COUNCIL,
http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/assisted-suicide-state-laws/ (last updated Jan.
6, 2017); see, e.g., People v. Duffy, 595 N.E.2d 814 (N.Y. 1992). The court in this case found the
defendant guilty for bringing out a gun and handing the weapon to a suicidal minor,
challenging the youth to shoot himself, because it is reckless for “a person who, knowing
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A. Involuntary Manslaughter Under Massachusetts Law
Because Massachusetts has no statute criminalizing the
assistance or encouragement of suicide, the state’s courts generally
choose to analyze cases such as Michelle Carter’s under a theory of
involuntary manslaughter. Under Massachusetts common law,113
“[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is an unlawful homicide
unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such a disregard
of probable harmful consequences to another as to amount to
wanton or reckless conduct.”114 Conduct is wanton or reckless
when it is intentional and highly likely to result in substantial harm
to another.115 Culpable conduct stems from what the defendant
knew, or what a reasonable person should have known, under the
same circumstances.116 Wantonness or recklessness can be
established by either an intentional act or an intentional omission
where the defendant has a duty to act.117 While, generally, “one
does not have a duty to take affirmative action, . . . a duty to prevent
harm . . . arises when one creates a dangerous situation.”118 Thus, in
Michelle Carter’s case, the prosecution bore the burden of proving

that another is contemplating immediate suicide, deliberately prods that person to go
forward and furnishes the means of bringing about death.” Id. at 815. While assisted suicide
statutes are more common, it should also be noted that many governments “appear to be
reluctant” to prosecute suicide assistance, not just cases of suicide encouragement, and
“assistance statutes are seldom enforced.” Shaffer, supra note 59, at 370–71. Despite high
numbers of annual suicides in America, only a handful of cases involving assisted suicide
are nationally reported each year. Id.
113. Massachusetts has no statute addressing involuntary manslaughter. See
Commonwealth v. Godin, 371 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Mass. 1975) (“There is no statutory definition
of manslaughter. The elements of the crime are derived from the common law.”).
114. Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 328 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. 1975).
115. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944).
116. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1060 (Mass. 2016) (citing
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 672 (Mass. 2012)).
117. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d at 685. For an example of an intentional act resulting in
involuntary manslaughter, see Commonwealth v. Walker, 812 N.E.2d 262, 270–71 (Mass.
2004), where the court affirmed a conviction of involuntary manslaughter against a
defendant who attempted to drug a victim by providing the victim with an alcoholic drink
mixed with sleeping pills. For an example of a conviction of involuntary manslaughter for
an omission to act, see Commonwealth v. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2002). In this case,
the court found that defendants who started a fire and simply allowed it to burn may have
had a duty to “tak[e] adequate steps either to control [the fire] or to report it to the proper
authorities.” Id. at 57.
118. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d at 56 (emphasis added).
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that Carter’s conduct “(1) was intentional; (2) was wanton or
reckless; and (3) caused the victim’s death.”119
B. The Court’s Reasoning in Carter
In Michelle Carter’s case, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
identified the principal question to be whether an individual can be
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter “where the defendant’s
conduct did not extend beyond words.”120 Carter asserted that her
conduct could not be wanton or reckless because she was not
physically present at Roy’s suicide and the fact that she provided
no physical assistance whatsoever.121 In other words, Carter argued
“that verbal conduct can never overcome a person’s willpower to
live, and therefore cannot be the cause of a suicide.”122 The court
disagreed, finding that no cases in Massachusetts explicitly require
physical action to indict someone for involuntary manslaughter.123
Further, the court found that Carter’s constant communication with
the victim through text messages and phone conversations
constituted a “virtual” presence.124 Ultimately, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court affirmed Michelle Carter’s indictment for
involuntary manslaughter.125
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the 2016 Carter holding, as
well as the later verdict by Judge Moniz in 2017, is the emphasis
placed on three words uttered by Carter over the phone before Roy
died: “Get back in.”126 The court found that the “coercive quality of
that final directive” overcame the victim’s willpower, which led to
Roy “obey[ing] [Carter], returning to the truck, closing the door,
and succumbing to the carbon monoxide.”127
In fact, the court found that there was sufficient evidence of
probable cause that Carter caused Roy’s death because “but for the
defendant’s admonishments, pressure, and instructions, the victim
would not have gotten back into the truck and poisoned himself to

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1061 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1061 n.13.
Id. at 1056 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1063; Glaun, supra note 22.
Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1063.
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death.”128 Similarly, in the 2017 verdict, Judge Moniz found that
Carter’s command to return to the truck created the
circumstances that led to Roy’s death.129 Because of this, Carter
owed her dying boyfriend a duty to at least attempt to save his
life.130 Specifically, “[Carter’s] failure to act, where she had a selfcreated duty to Mr. Roy since she had put him into that toxic
environment, constituted . . . wanton and reckless conduct” under
Massachusetts’ involuntary manslaughter law.131
In these rulings, no mention is made of Carter potentially
assisting Roy’s suicide—only that she encouraged and caused it.132
It is troubling that three words spoken over the phone, combined
with a bundle of text messages, are enough to establish causation
on par with other suicide cases, such as when causation was
established after a man physically beat his victim to the point that
she threw herself out of a window.133 These other cases indicate that
the focus of criminal liability within suicide law leans more heavily
on whether mens rea exists, rather than looking to the actus reus of
the crime. In Michelle Carter’s case, the court seems to reason that
Carter’s instruction to “get back in” the truck established
elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter. Specifically,
Carter’s conduct was intentional, was wanton or reckless, and
caused Roy’s death.134
However, these three words alone still seem to be feeble
grounds upon which to base a finding that a defendant created the
circumstances for a suicide. This contention is bolstered by the fact
that Michelle Carter’s communications with Roy leading up to his
death came only by faceless, electronic means.135 Without any
statutory law to support a criminal conviction for Carter, the court’s
decision exhibits a form of lawmaking from the bench that exceeds
the judiciary’s role in American democracy.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1064.
Glaun, supra note 22.
Id.
Id.
See generally Carter, 52 N.E.3d; Glaun, supra note 22.
See generally State v. Lassiter, 484 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); see also
supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
134. Glaun, supra note 22.
135. See Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1057.
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III. HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS IMPACTED SUICIDE LAW
This Part explores how, if at all, modern technology has
transformed the way the law treats both suicide and those who
assist or encourage its commission. Since the advent of mobile
telephones and the World Wide Web, digital technology has been
a pervasive and omnipresent part of life in the United States. Recent
studies show that roughly nine out of ten Americans use the
Internet, which is a significant increase from the five out of ten
Americans who were online in 2000.136 Going further, more than
seventy percent of the American public use at least one social media
site.137 As far as mobile phone usage is concerned, ninety-six
percent of the United States population owns a cellphone of some
kind.138 Eighty-one percent of Americans own a smartphone.139 Of
that number, ninety-seven percent of smartphone owners text on a
regular basis.140
In other words, the Internet and mobile technology dominate
the average American’s day-to-day life. The following discussion
examines current case law and legislation, arguing that the criminal
potential for encouraging suicide has changed with the
development of new technologies.
A. Modern Cases Similar in Nature to Commonwealth v. Carter
1. United States v. Drew
United States v. Drew is one of the most notorious cases relating
to suicide and modern technology.141 This case began in Missouri
with a mother, Lori Drew, who set up a fake profile on MySpace.142
Drew impersonated a sixteen-year-old boy in order to target
thirteen-year-old Megan Meier, who was a classmate of Drew’s

136. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.
org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ (last updated June 12, 2019).
137. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.
pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ (last updated June 12, 2019).
138. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile/ (last updated June 12, 2019).
139. Id.
140. See U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 2015) http://www.
pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/.
141. See generally United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
142. Id. at 452.
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daughter.143 Masquerading as a teenager, Drew began to flirt with
Megan on MySpace and then turned against her, eventually telling
Megan that “the world would be a better place without her in it.”144
That same day, Megan ended her own life.145
The interesting aspect of this case is that the prosecution did not
charge Drew under any kind of bullying, harassment, or suicide
laws. This is, in large part, because no Missouri law substantially
addressed this kind of online conduct.146 In fact, Missouri
prosecutors refused to file charges against Lori Drew because “the
case did not fit into any law.”147 Instead, the federal government
rather unconventionally pursued claims alleging that Drew had
violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).148 Drew was
ultimately not convicted under the CFAA.149 This rendered Drew a
prime example of attorneys admirably, but futilely, attempting to
conform a law to the facts of a case in the absence of an appropriate
statute. In response to Drew, Missouri legislators amended the
state’s laws to include penalties for bullying and harassment
specifically through electronic communications.150
Applying this case to Carter, it is unprogressive for
Massachusetts to continue relying on common law involuntary
manslaughter theories to convict defendants for another’s
suicide.151 In the wake of Drew, the Missouri legislators promptly
responded to address the criminality of certain behaviors
conducted through electronic communications. Likewise, the
lawmakers in Massachusetts should also break the silence as to
whether encouraging or assisting suicide through electronic
communications can be illegal. The legislature should not leave the
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Prosecutor: No Criminal Charges in MySpace Suicide, FOX NEWS (Dec. 3, 2007),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/03/prosecutor-no-criminal-charges-inmyspace-suicide.html.
147. Id.
148. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451.
149. See id. at 468.
150. See S.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008), http://www.
senate.mo.gov/08info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=147; see also Associated
Press, Missouri Passes Cyber-Bullying Bill, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2008), http://articles.
latimes.com/2008/may/17/nation/na-suicide17.
151. While Massachusetts has no statutory suicide laws, it does have a cyberbullying
statute. See S.B. 2323, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009).
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courts to work this out on their own without any guidance. Doing
so forces the courts to inappropriately stretch potentially outdated
common law to fit this modern scenario.
As a side note, the Drew case brings the issue of cyberbullying
into the discussion of suicide law. While this Note does not focus
on cyberbullying, it should be noted that, since the advent of the
Internet, cell phones, and social media networks, cyberbullying has
become a growing concern, particularly for minors.152 However,
Michelle Carter’s conduct does not fall under the umbrella of
typical cyberbullying. While cyberbullying is important in the
context of technology and suicide, it does not speak to the narrower
issue of suicide encouragement that surrounds Michelle Carter,
other than to raise potential concerns as to whether the outcome of
Carter could create higher culpability for cyberbullies who cruelly,
but likely not in actual seriousness, instruct their victims to “kill
themselves” or “jump off a bridge.”153
2. Suzanne Gonzales
While cyberbullying is perhaps the most obvious problem that
encompasses technology and suicide, web-assisted suicides are
also a troubling concept. Web-assisted suicides result from online
forums that encourage suicide and share tips on how to kill oneself.
Unsurprisingly, websites like this lend themselves to tragic results,
such as in the case of Suzanne Gonzales.154 Gonzales was a college
student who discovered a popular online suicide newsgroup called
Alt.Suicide.Holiday, or ASH.155 After finding this website,
Gonzales posted more than 100 messages in the weeks leading up

152. Studies conducted by the Cyberbullying Research Center indicate that
cyberbullying victims in middle and high schools have been increasing in numbers over the
past decade across the United States. See Justin W. Patchin, Summary of Our Cyberbullying
Research (2004–2016), CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (Nov. 26, 2016), https://cyberbullying.org/
summary-of-our-cyberbullying-research.
153. See infra Part IV for a discussion of these concerns and other potential ramifications
of Carter.
154. See generally Thelma Gutierrez & Kim McCabe, Parents: Online Newsgroup Helped
Daughter Commit Suicide, CNN (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/11/
04/suicide.internet/index.html.
155. Id.
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to her death.156 She gathered information from the site on how to
illegally obtain potassium cyanide and how to mix it into a lethal
poison.157 A member of ASH even helped Gonzales write her
suicide note.158
Gonzales’s story is certainly not the first of its kind,159 but her
particular death inspired a reaction on a federal level.160 Suzy’s Law
was proposed after Gonzales’s suicide as legislation that would
prohibit groups like ASH from advising or teaching people how to
commit suicide.161 However, Suzy’s Law has been introduced no
less than three times since Gonzales’s death and has never
passed.162 This failure to enact such legislation indicates that the
federal government does not ultimately desire to ban discussion,
encouragement, or instruction on suicide, either in person or
through electronic communications. Applying this to the Carter
case, it is evident that America’s federal lawmakers would rather
preserve the freedom of speech and expression through electronic
communications, than make conduct such as Michelle Carter’s into
a federal crime.163
3. State v. Melchert-Dinkel
In one recent and particularly relevant case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court found that a state statute prohibiting the
156. Julia Scheeres, A Virtual Path to Suicide / Depressed Student Killed Herself with Help
from Online Discussion Group, SFGATE (June 8, 2003), http://www.sfgate.com/
news/article/A-VIRTUAL-PATH-TO-SUICIDE-Depressed-student-2611315.php.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See,
e.g.,
Point,
Click
and
Die,
NEWSWEEK
(June
29,
2003),
http://www.newsweek.com/point-click-and-die-138301 (detailing two stories—first, of a
young woman who hung herself after finding detailed information about suicide by hanging
online; and second, of a fifty-two-year-old woman who used helium gas to overdose after
viewing a website that provided instructions on an effective method of suicide by helium);
Ian Cobain, Clampdown on Chatrooms After Two Strangers Die in First Internet Death Pact,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2005), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/oct/11/socialcare.
technology (discussing the new trend of “suicide chat rooms,” which allow users to
encourage and even instruct other users on suicide methods); Jonathan Owen, Teens Die After
Logging into ‘Suicide Chat Rooms’, INDEPENDENT (Sep. 10, 2006), http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/teens-die-after-logging-into-suicide-chat-rooms-415386.html
(“Pro-suicide websites and chat rooms have been implicated in the deaths of at least 16
young people in the UK in the past few years.”).
160. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 968.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 968–69.
163. See also infra Section V.A.
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encouragement of suicide was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.164 In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the defendant posed
online as a nurse.165 He responded to various posts on suicide
websites.166 He eventually succeeded in persuading two
individuals to kill themselves.167 Melchert-Dinkel offered his
victims sympathy and reassurance in their online conversations,
while also describing methods of how to commit suicide by
hanging.168 After his actions were discovered, Melchert-Dinkel was
initially convicted on two counts of encouraging suicide under a
Minnesota statute.169 The statute provided that anyone who
“intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another in taking the
other’s own life” was subject to criminal punishment.170
On appeal, the court found that the inclusion of both “advises”
and “encourages” in the statute was unconstitutional under the
First Amendment because this language “broadly include[s] speech
that provides support or rallies courage,” and neither advising nor
encouraging suicide automatically carries a causal connection with
the suicide.171 However, the court also held that the statute was
severable and that assisting a suicide was still illegal under
Minnesota law.172 Further, the court found that, while encouraging
and advising suicide is protected by the First Amendment, mere
words could still constitute criminal assistance under the
Minnesota statute if a direct, causal link existed between the speech
and the suicide.173 The court reasoned:

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See generally State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).
Id. at 16–17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17–19.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1998); see also Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 17–

19.
171. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 23.
172. Id. at 23–24.
173. Id. at 23.
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[Assistance] . . . proscribes speech or conduct that provides
another person with what is needed for the person to commit
suicide. This signifies a level of involvement in the suicide beyond
merely expressing a moral viewpoint or providing general
comfort or support. Rather, “assist,” by its plain meaning,
involves enabling the person to commit suicide. While
enablement perhaps most obviously occurs in the context of
physical assistance, speech alone may also enable a person to commit
suicide. Here, we need only note that speech instructing another
on suicide methods falls within the ambit of constitutional
limitations on speech that assists another in committing suicide.174

The court ultimately reversed and remanded Melchert-Dinkel’s
case to be viewed in light of Minnesota’s revised statute with the
words “advis[ing]” and “encourag[ing]” removed.175 Interestingly,
Melchert-Dinkel was still convicted on remand for one count of
“assisting” suicide because Melchert-Dinkel provided very specific
instructions for a hanging method.176 The court found this qualified
as “assistance” because one of his victims chose to hang himself.177
Applying this case to the issues raised by Carter leads to some
compelling discussion. The holding in Melchert-Dinkel indicates
that the court’s reasoning for convicting Michelle Carter of
manslaughter—Carter’s insistence that her boyfriend “get back in”
the truck—would be a violation of the First Amendment because
those three words merely constituted encouragement. On the other
hand, if Massachusetts were to enact an assisted suicide statute,
Michelle Carter’s text messages and phone conversations with Roy
could, under the court’s analysis in Melchert-Dinkel, make her liable
for assisting Roy’s suicide: Carter gave Roy advice about
committing suicide through carbon monoxide poisoning.178 Thus,
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 24–25.
176. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. A15-0073, 2015 WL 9437531, at *5–9 (Minn. Ct. App.

2015).
177. Id.
178. See Read Text Messages, Other Evidence from the Trial of Michelle Carter, WCVB

(June 13, 2017), http://www.wcvb.com/article/evidence-from-the-trial-of-michelle-carter/
10011731 [https://htv-prod-media.s3.amazonaws.com/files/carter-exhibit-30-1497356322.
pdf]. For instance, in planning the suicide via text together, Carter texted Roy that,
“generators produce a lot of CO, so if you just turn it on in your car, take some beneryls [sic]
before just incase, [sic] and then you’ll breathe it in and pass out and die very quickly and
peacefully with no pain at all.” Id. However, while there are numerous instances of Carter
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Carter’s words may actually have crossed the bridge from mere
encouragement to assistance under the Melchert-Dinkel standard
because she gave her boyfriend significant advice pertaining to
carbon monoxide poisoning. However, in the absence of statutory
law, the Carter court overreached in using common law to hold
Michelle Carter guilty based on words alone.
B. Physical Versus Virtual Presence
One of Michelle Carter’s main arguments was that her conduct
could not qualify as involuntary manslaughter because she was not
“physically present when the victim killed himself.”179 The court
responded that nothing in Massachusetts’ case law requires that the
defendant be physically present in order to establish involuntary
manslaughter.180 However, the court also neglected to mention that
all similar suicide cases in Massachusetts involved a defendant who
was physically present at the time of the victim’s death.
1. Examples in Massachusetts case law of encouraging suicide
The laws behind the encouragement of suicide in
Massachusetts stretch back more than 200 years to the 1816 case of
Commonwealth v. Bowen.181 George Bowen was a prisoner on trial for
murder after successfully encouraging Jonathan Jewett, a fellow
inmate, to hang himself the night before Jewett’s scheduled
execution.182 The court held that the most vital fact to examine was
whether Bowen was “instrumental in the death of Jewett, by advice
or otherwise.”183 The central question for the jury was: “Did
[Bowen’s] advice procure the death of Jewett?”184 The
Commonwealth presented evidence that Bowen had consistently

giving Roy such general advice, it would be difficult to prove that she assisted Roy’s suicide
because her texts arguably did not give Roy specific or detailed instructions as to how to
commit suicide. Id.
179. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1061 (Mass. 2016).
180. Id.
181. See generally Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
182. Id. at 356.
183. Id. at 359.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
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urged Jewett to take his death into his own hands.185 Speaking to
the jury, the court stated:
[I]t is in man’s nature to revolt at the idea of self-destruction.
Where a person is predetermined upon the commission of this
crime, the seasonable admonitions of a discreet and respected
friend would probably tend to overthrow his determination. On
the other hand, the counsel of an unprincipled wretch, stating the
heroism and courage the self-murderer displays, might induce,
encourage, and fix the intention, and ultimately procure the
perpetration of the dreadful deed. And, if other men would be
influenced by such advice, the presumption is, that Jewett was so
influenced. He might have been influenced by many powerful
motives to destroy himself. Still, the inducements might have
been insufficient to procure the actual commission of the act, and
one word of additional advice might have turned the scale.
If you are satisfied that Jewett, previously to any acquaintance or
conversation with the prisoner, had determined within himself
that his own hand should terminate his existence, and that he
esteemed the conversation with the prisoner, so far as it affected
himself, as mere idle talk, let your verdict say so. But, if you find
the prisoner encouraged and kept alive motives previously
existing in Jewett’s mind, and suggested others to augment their
influence, you will decide accordingly.
. . . [T]here is no period of human life which is not precious as a
season of repentance. The culprit, though under sentence of
death, is cheered by hope to the last moment of his existence.186

Ultimately, the jury in Bowen returned a verdict of not guilty.187
The jury found that Bowen’s encouragement was not the procuring
cause of Jewett’s suicide.188 This case set a significant precedent in
Massachusetts that “the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the suicide counselor actually ‘procured’ or was
responsible for the act itself.”189 Additionally, it is of import to note
that Bowen’s cell was directly adjacent to Jewett’s cell, which
placed the two men “in such a situation that they could freely
185. Jack Tager, “Murder by Counseling”: The 1816 Case of George Bowen (Northampton),
38 HIST. J. MASS. 102, 104 (2010).
186. Bowen, 13 Mass. at 359–60.
187. Id. at 360–61.
188. Id.
189. Tager, supra note 185.
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converse together” and where Bowen was able to “repeatedly and
frequently advise[] and urge[] Jewett to destroy himself.”190
Nevertheless, in spite of Bowen’s physical presence and proximity
to the victim prior to Jewett’s suicide, the jury still refused to
impose a guilty verdict.
In Commonwealth v. Atencio, two defendants were found guilty
of involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts law after
playing a game of “Russian roulette.”191 The two defendants had
both taken turns pulling the trigger on a revolver containing only
one cartridge, with no result.192 However, the game came to a tragic
end when the third member of their party took his turn in the game,
dying from a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head.193 The court
found that “the concerted action and cooperation of the defendants
in helping to bring about the deceased’s foolish act” qualified as
wanton or reckless conduct.194 Notably, the court found that no
duty existed for the defendants to prevent the third party from
playing Russian roulette; however, the defendants’ “mutual
encouragement in a joint enterprise” breached a duty “not to
cooperate or join with him in the ‘game.’”195
Similarly, in the case of Persampieri v. Commonwealth, the court
affirmed a man’s involuntary manslaughter indictment for his
wife’s self-induced death.196 The defendant had told his wife that
he wished for a divorce.197 She responded by threatening to commit
suicide.198 At this point, her husband claimed that she was too
cowardly to go through with such an endeavor.199 He reminded her
that she had failed to complete her attempted suicides on no less
than two previous occasions.200 The defendant then instructed his
wife to retrieve the rifle in the kitchen.201 She did so, and at her
request, the defendant loaded the weapon for her, since she

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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Bowen, 13 Mass. at 356.
See generally Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963).
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 225.
Id.
See generally Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961).
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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struggled to load it herself.202 He then handed the rifle to his wife,
noting that the safety was off.203 She placed the weapon on the floor
between her legs, with the muzzle against her forehead, but was
unable to reach the trigger in such a position.204 The defendant
suggested that she remove her shoes in order to reach the trigger.205
After removing one of her shoes, the rifle went off, and the
defendant’s wife died.206
The court found that the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently
wanton or reckless to satisfy a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter because:
[I]nstead of trying to bring [his wife] to her senses, [the defendant]
taunted her, told her where the gun was, loaded it for her, saw
that the safety was off, and told her the means by which she could
pull the trigger . . . thus show[ing] a reckless disregard of his
wife’s safety and the possible consequences of his conduct.207

The cases of Bowen, Atencio, and Persampieri all have one crucial
element in common. In these three cases, all of which were relied
on by the court in Carter or by the court in Michelle Carter’s 2017
verdict, the defendants had some kind of physical presence at the
time of each respective decedents’ suicides. What is more, the
defendant in Persampieri actually physically assisted his wife with
her suicide. Thus, while the Carter court was correct that
Massachusetts common law for involuntary manslaughter does not
explicitly require a physical presence, the cases where a
Massachusetts defendant was convicted for involuntary
manslaughter after encouraging or assisting a suicide all strongly
imply a physical presence requirement.
2. Virtual presence
One could argue that if a physical presence was necessary to
convict Michelle Carter, she still qualifies due to her virtual
presence. Indeed, the court in Carter held that, “[a]lthough not
physically present when the victim committed suicide, the constant
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 390.
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communication with him by text message and by telephone leading
up to and during the suicide made the defendant’s presence at
least virtual.”208
This raises the key question as to whether such a virtual
presence can be equated with an actual presence. On the one hand,
courts have held that, for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a
virtual presence is not equivalent to a physical presence.209 On the
other hand, in the context of defamation, courts have found that an
online presence is just as important, or “perhaps more important,”
than a person’s physical presence.210
Even more concerning than the finding that virtual presence
can be more important than physical presence is the line-drawing
issue. This issue may come into play when courts consider whether
all virtual presences are equal for suicide encouragement, or if
some virtual presences should be labeled as more culpable than
others. For instance, it is unclear where the greatest liability lies for
an individual having a conversation with a suicidal acquaintance.
There are myriad ways to communicate with others in the digital
age. It will be left to the courts to decide whether texts, phone calls,
Skype conversations, tweets, and YouTube comments will weigh
equally on the scale of blameworthiness under modern suicide
law. Overall, this area of the law is ambiguous. For that reason, in
the context of suicide law, the court’s decision in Carter to
offhandedly equate a virtual presence with a physical presence
lacks any settled precedent.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
While Michelle Carter’s case is certainly not binding in federal
court or in other state jurisdictions, it has been widely publicized
on a national level.211 If other courts find this case persuasive in the
future, it could have troubling ramifications in the realm of suicide
208. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1061 n.13 (Mass. 2016).
209. State v. Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d 495, 504 (Iowa 2014) (finding that two-way

videoconferencing technology does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment because “[t]echnology
has changed since the late eighteenth century, but human nature has not,” and “no form of
virtual testimony can fully satisfy” the experience of in-person encounters).
210. Bouveng v. NYG Capital LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 280, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
211. See, e.g., Kalhan Rosenblatt, Suicide Case, Sentenced to 15 Months in Jail, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michelle-carter-convictedtexting-suicide-case-sentenced-15-months-jail-n789276.
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litigation. In particular, the fact that this case hinges on Carter’s
simple instruction to her boyfriend to “get back in” his car has the
potential to open a Pandora’s Box of criminal liability. The
following discussion will examine the possible ramifications of the
Carter holding, particularly focusing on concerns regarding the
First Amendment’s protection of speech.
A. Freedom of Speech and Expression
The First Amendment provides that, “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”212 This constitutional
protection extends to spoken and written words, as well as
expressive conduct.213 However, the First Amendment does not
provide an unrestrained right to speech. Forms of criminal speech
falling outside the shelter of the First Amendment include, but are
not limited to, obscenity, true threats, defamation, fighting words,
and speech inciting or integral to criminal conduct.214 Of course, the
encouragement of suicide does not fall under any of those
categories—not even incitement or speech integral to criminal
behavior, since suicide is no longer a crime in the United States.215
In the wake of Melchert-Dinkel,216 the constitutionality of any
statutory law prohibiting the encouragement of suicide may
potentially be called into question, particularly because these laws
are worded similarly and in broad terms.217 If statutes of this type
continue to be found in violation of the First Amendment, they
must pass a strict scrutiny test.218 Under this test, a content-based

212. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
213. David L. Hudson, Expressive Conduct and Symbolic Speech, LEGAL ALMANAC: THE

FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:9 (2012).
214. See Brent Christensen, Sacrifice, Lies, and the First Amendment: How the Supreme
Court Struck Down the Stolen Valor Act, 25 DCBA BRIEF 32, 33 (2012).
215. See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 19–20 (Minn. 2014) (finding that the
encouragement of suicide does not fall under the scope of incitement or speech integral to
criminal conduct because suicide was “not illegal in any of the jurisdictions at issue”).
Although speech encouraging suicide can result in harm, “the Supreme Court has never
recognized an exception to the First Amendment for speech that is integral to merely harmful
conduct, as opposed to illegal conduct.” Id.
216. See supra Section III.A.3.
217. See supra note 109. These statutes all tend to contain broad wording similar to the
Minnesota statute at issue in Melchert-Dinkel, imposing criminal liability for anyone who
willfully advises or encourages another to commit suicide. See supra note 105.; see also
Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 16.
218. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
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restriction of protected speech is only permitted if the restriction:
“[(1)] is justified by a compelling government interest and [(2)] is
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”219
While many courts would agree that preventing suicide is a
compelling interest,220 legislators face the lofty challenge of
narrowly tailoring the language of the statute to serve the interest
of preventing suicide. This is where the Minnesota statute failed in
Melchert-Dinkel.221 The United States Supreme Court has
emphasized that “a law rarely survives such scrutiny.”222
1. Where do we draw the line?
As with many controversial holdings, a concern at the heart of
the Michelle Carter case is where exactly citizens should expect the
future line to be drawn between innocent and guilty conduct in
electronic suicide discussions. Theoretically, this could be a
slippery slope for courts to tread down.
For instance, in response to a particularly obnoxious YouTube
video or controversial blog post, it certainly would not be
uncommon to see a slew of comments encouraging the posters of
such content to “do the world a favor” and kill themselves. While
comments like this, whether made in seriousness or jest, are truly
unkind and can end in tragedy,223 it is likely not in the country’s
best interest to censor online and electronic speech encouraging
suicide because of the line-drawing confusion such laws would
elicit. As another example, it is possible that a well-meaning
telephone operator offering comfort and sympathy on a suicide
hotline could face criminal charges for encouraging suicide if the
individual on the other end of the phone actually killed herself after
listening to the operator’s particular words.
219. Id.
220. E.g., Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 22 (holding that the government “has a

compelling interest in preserving human life”). It should be noted, of course, that preventing
suicide may not always remain quite as compelling of an interest as it is today, especially as
societal attitudes condemning suicide continue to shift, and more physician-assisted suicide
statutes are enacted. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
221. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 24.
222. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992).
223. See Michael E. Miller, ‘Killed Myself. Sorry.’: Transgender Game Developer Jumps Off
Bridge After Online Abuse, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/28/killed-myself-sorry-transgender-game-developerjumps-off-bridge-after-online-abuse/?utm_term=.595e77a1ef9e.

644

006.TAYLOR_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

613

2/14/20 1:52 PM

Kill Me Through the Phone

These hypothetical illustrations are admittedly distinguishable
from the specific situation in Carter of a defendant personally
urging their long-term boyfriend to get back in a vehicle filled with
carbon monoxide and complete his attempted suicide. But the
outcome in Carter undoubtedly sets a troubling precedent for
electronic speech. The holding indicates that words alone, even
uttered by a faraway speaker over the phone or transmitted from a
long distance through text messages, may qualify as direct
causation of a suicide.
The court in Carter refused to draw any kind of line between
speech and physical action under the involuntary manslaughter
criteria.224 This is problematic. As discussed earlier,225 the attitude
toward suicide has shifted for many citizens in the last few decades.
Based on society’s softened attitude toward suicide, the state
legislature should respond by creating some kind of explicit
boundaries between culpable and non-culpable conduct in order to
clarify what that state’s attitude is toward suicide. If not, there is
danger that the common law or poorly-worded encouragement
statutes will ensnare innocent people and innocent conduct in their
widely cast net.
2. The chilling effect
In particular, even if conduct encouraging suicide is not
criminalized, the confusion and outrage that many have expressed
regarding Michelle Carter’s case226 could create unintended
consequences.
The holding could discourage people from
engaging in perfectly lawful discussions and conduct for fear of
being punished, effectively chilling speech surrounding suicide.227
Even if preventing suicide is a compelling government interest, it
cannot reasonably be any state’s intent to discourage all open
discussions and conversations relating to suicide and end-of-life

224. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1063 (Mass. 2016) (“We need not—and
indeed cannot—define where on the spectrum between speech and physical acts involuntary
manslaughter must fall. Instead, the inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis.”).
225. See supra Section I.A.
226. See, e.g., Robby Soave, Opinion, Michelle Carter Didn’t Kill with a Text, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/opinion/michelle-carter-didntkill-with-a-text.html (raising concerns that in Carter’s case, “the court . . . dealt a blow to the
constitutionally enshrined idea that speech is not, itself, violence”).
227. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 973.

645

006.TAYLOR_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/14/20 1:52 PM

2019

decisions. Suicide is certainly a heavy and often disturbing topic of
discussion, but “[i]f there be time to expose . . . [and] avert the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”228
B. The Future of Assisted Suicide Groups
Another potential dilemma involves whether the court’s
reasoning in Carter will affect the future of assisted suicide for the
terminally ill. For example, “can a doctor (or close friend or loved
one) talk to a terminally ill patient (or friend) if that mentally
capable person has made the decision to end their life? Dare they
agree in writing . . . with the loved one’s decision?”229 Of course, in
Carter, the court takes care to state that Michelle Carter’s case “is
not about a person seeking to ameliorate the anguish of someone
coping with a terminal illness and questioning the value of life” nor
“about a person offering support, comfort, and even assistance to a
mature adult who . . . has decided to end his or her life.”230
However, this is dicta.231 Thus, theoretically, those offering advice
or encouragement on end-of-life decisions, whether in-person or
through more remote forms of communication like text messages,
may be subject to criminal prosecution in any jurisdiction that finds
the reasoning in Carter to be persuasive. This notion becomes
particularly unsettling in the context of online groups, such as
suicide chat rooms or forums.232 How far does the liability for
suicide encouragement extend? Could every member of such
groups who dares to submit a comment that casts suicide in a
positive light be charged with criminal conduct?

228. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
229. Philip Nitschke, Opinion, Euthanasia by Text? Michelle Carter Case Impacts More

Than Just Free Speech, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June 20, 2017, 12:15 AM),
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/euthanasia-by-text-lessons-from-the-michelle-cartercase-20170625-gwxzoo.html.
230. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1064 (Mass. 2016).
231. Id. “A statement is dictum if it could have been deleted without seriously
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding and—being peripheral—may not have
received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered it,” and therefore is not
binding. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 223 (2019). Because they would not impair the foundations of the
court’s holding, the statements made in Carter describing what the case “is not about” fit
within this definition of dictum.
232. See supra notes 159–163 and accompanying text.
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Such a broad and uncertain scope of liability for suicide
encouragement flies in the face of the First Amendment,
particularly for those who frequently discuss the issue of suicide in
group settings. While most would agree that romanticizing suicide
is a disturbing use of one’s right to freedom of speech, suicide is
also an important area of discussion and debate. “If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”233
V. SOLUTIONS
“The remedy for this situation is in the Legislature.”234 The
underlying argument in this Note is that current statutory laws
prohibiting the encouragement of suicide and common law suicide
principles such as those detailed in Michelle Carter’s case are
potentially outdated. There is no settled precedent for words or
psychological coercion alone qualifying as the cause for suicide.235
And now, modern technology has enabled people to interact and
communicate with each other with an ease and at a magnitude that
would have been incomprehensible to lawmakers in the earlier
days of suicide litigation. It is reasonable to assume that as time
goes on, technology will only become a more inescapable part of
life, and cases like Michelle Carter’s will not be uncommon.
A. The Need to Address Encouragement of Suicide
in Statutory Suicide Laws
Because of the concerns of modern technology implicating the
rights of free speech, this Note agrees with the Melchert-Dinkel
standard that penalizing someone for another’s suicide based
broadly on encouragement, without more, is a violation of the First
233. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). This First Amendment protection covers
even words that may cause psychological and emotional pain. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443 (2011). “Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy
and sorrow, and . . . inflict great pain. . . . As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.” Id. at 460–61.
234. People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). Prefacing the
suggestion of legislative remediation in this case, the court found that “[w]hat conduct
constitutes the crime of incitement to suicide is vague, and undefined and no reasonably
ascertainable standard of guilt has been set forth.” Id.
235. See supra Section I.B.1.a.(1).
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Amendment.236 This standard strikes the right balance because,
while criminalizing words encouraging suicide, it still requires the
words to actually enable the suicide through specific instructions
or other verbal aid.
This Note acknowledges, of course, that some states desire to
maintain their traditional suicide encouragement provisions;
however, every state should closely examine such provisions to
ensure that they are not overly inclusive. Any law criminalizing the
encouragement of suicide must likely pass strict scrutiny, requiring
the states to narrowly tailor the statute’s language to the compelling
government interest of preventing suicide.237 In addition, it is
important for states to make clarifications in all assisted-suicide
laws whether words alone can qualify as assistance, or if physical
action or presence is required. One suitable example of this is the
Illinois statutory law on suicide inducement, which provides:
(a) A person commits inducement to commit suicide when he or
she does either of the following:
(1) Knowingly coerces another to commit suicide and the
other person commits or attempts to commit suicide as a
direct result of the coercion, and he or she exercises
substantial control over the other person through (i) control
of the other person’s physical location or circumstances;
(ii) use of psychological pressure; or (iii) use of actual or
ostensible religious, political, social, philosophical or
other principles.
(2) With knowledge that another person intends to commit or
attempt to commit suicide, intentionally (i) offers and
provides the physical means by which another person
commits or attempts to commit suicide, or (ii) participates in
a physical act by which another person commits or attempts
to commit suicide.238

236. See supra notes 164–177 and accompanying text.
237. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 974–75. Sweeney offers several recommendations

for how to narrowly tailor a statute prohibiting the encouragement of suicide. Id. These
include: (1) explicitly including a high mens rea requirement, such as “knowingly”; (2)
requiring some degree of interaction between the defendant and the victim; and (3) requiring
prosecutors to show both a subjective and objective component to prove culpability in the
defendant’s conduct. Id.
238. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-34.5 (2011).
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While this statute is not perfect, the Illinois legislature has done
an admirable job in attempting to establish more definitive and
straightforward protocols for which kinds of behavior lead to
suicide liability. In particular, Illinois law indicates that words
alone may be enough to criminalize suicide encouragement if the
suicide is a “direct result” of the inducement, and if the encourager
has “substantial control” over the victim, such as through the
power of “psychological pressure.”239 The language of the statute
narrows the scope of criminal behavior. It reduces the line-drawing
problems240 of common-law jurisdictions like Massachusetts, or of
states with overly broad statutes prohibiting all forms of suicide
encouragement. Thus, if states desire to punish suicide
encouragement, the legislature should follow the example of
Illinois. It should enact statutes with clear-cut suicide
encouragement guidelines, dictating when one’s words of support
or reassurance become criminal.
B. The Need to Address Electronic Communications
in Statutory Suicide Laws
Many states, of course, have already enacted suicide legislation,
but they should take the influence of cyberspace into account. They
should consider whether that realm is pervasive enough to
necessitate amendments. Specifically, state legislatures should
consider enacting or revising their statutes to explain where
electronic communications fit within the context of encouraging or
assisting suicide. If the act of encouraging suicide by electronic
means will constitute a crime, then statutory law should be clear on
that point in order to provide fair notice.241 Suicide should not be
litigated under a theory of common law involuntary manslaughter,
like it was in Michelle Carter’s case. Instead, states should
specifically create legislation pertaining to suicide assistance and
possibly suicide encouragement. Within these statutes, states
should address whether physical action or a physical presence is

239. Id.
240. See supra Section IV.A.1.
241. McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning should

be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line
should be clear.”).
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needed, or if a virtual presence can be sufficient in the context of
modern technology. Above all, states should enact careful
legislation to provide clear guidelines on exactly what conduct,
virtual or not, is lethal within suicide law.
Some observers have argued that legislatures do not need to
make special statutes just to incorporate electronic communications
into current law. During a 1996 presentation, Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook described leaders at the University of Chicago Law
School as “proud” that the school did not offer a course covering
“The Law of the Horse.”242 Obviously, Easterbrook did not say this
to insult those who specialize in legal battles surrounding livestock;
instead, his remark reflected the opinion that legal areas of study
“should be limited to subjects that c[an] illuminate the entire
law. . . . Only by putting the law of the horse in the context of
broader rules about commercial endeavors c[an] one really
understand the law about horses.”243 Easterbrook applied this
principle to the Internet, implying that most conduct in cyberspace
is easily classifiable under already-existing legal principles.244
One could argue that the law of the horse applies to statutory
law as well. In other words, perhaps no statutes at all should
specifically address digital behavior. Instead, maybe all actions
conducted electronically should be examined within the scope of
more general, existing laws. On the other hand, it is evident that
Judge Easterbrook, speaking at a conference in 1996, simply could
not have foreseen the way that technology and the Internet would
come to pervade every corner of the modern world in such a brief
span of time. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that his point
comparing the legal issues surrounding technology and cyberspace
to “the law of the horse” is rather antiquated.
While maintaining the rigidity of certain laws, constitutions,
and statutes within the United States is an imperative duty of the
legislature, no one can deny that emerging technologies can

242. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
207 (1996).
243. Id. at 207–08.
244. Id.; see also JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & PROBLEMS 9 (7th ed.
2017) (“To this day, ‘the law of the horse’ is a code phrase among scholars for the idea that
there’s nothing new here, that studying Internet law is nothing more than an exercise in
applying unrelated bodies of law to the Internet, with no unifying doctrines or truly
distinctive insights.”).
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sometimes, and perhaps often do, change the rules of the game.
That is the biggest concern about Michelle Carter’s case. The
judicial branch took it upon itself to expand the state’s common law
suicide theories to include culpability for words alone. It did so
without seriously considering the difference between a virtual and
physical presence. It arguably did so without any valid precedent
or statute to justify such a holding under the specific circumstances.
If the state of Massachusetts wishes to criminalize behavior like
Carter’s, then the legislature should enact a clear and narrowlytailored statute. The statute should address the criminality of both
suicide assistance and suicide encouragement, as well as where
electronic communications fall within the scope of culpability for
such behavior.
Ultimately, the decision to expand the law under these
circumstances should not have been left in judicial hands. The
Constitution of the United States vests specific governmental
powers in three branches of government, which are each meant to
remain distinct and separate.245 Generally speaking, the judiciary’s
role is to apply and interpret laws created by the people’s elected
representatives, not to legislate from the bench. Thus, it is essential
that “judges resist the temptation to become politicians in robes.”246
The Founders of this nation recognized that, “[w]ere the power of
judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be
the legislator.”247 While it is important to most states, including
Massachusetts, to deter any kind of suicide-enabling behavior, this
endeavor should begin with the legislature.
As for other jurisdictions that already have such suicide
statutes, these laws should potentially be amended to narrow any
overly inclusive language that could violate the First Amendment.
They should address the issues of electronic communications and
virtual presence. Such laws cannot remain generalized. Stretching
current law in order to hold an individual accountable for another
person’s suicide is an ill-advised endeavor for courts to pursue.248

245. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1.
246. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Lecture, Politicians in Robes: The Separation of Powers and

the Problem of Judicial Legislation, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 31, 49 (2015).
247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 302–03 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
248. See generally supra Section III.A.1.
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In the case of Drew, the Missouri lawmakers understood that the
state’s harassment laws needed amendments to compensate for
changing technologies.249 Likewise, states should amend or enact
suicide laws to meet the needs of the digital era.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Note is not to defend Michelle Carter.
Suicide remains a devastating problem in the United States,250 and
Carter’s conduct is undoubtedly “morally reprehensible” to many
American citizens.251 Indeed, perhaps a carefully constructed
suicide statute could have led a court to reach the same conclusion
as to Michelle Carter’s guilt under the law. However, in the absence
of such a statute, Michelle Carter’s verbal advisement and
encouragement of her boyfriend’s suicide solely through electronic
communications, without anything more, should not have resulted
in a guilty verdict under Massachusetts common law.
It is particularly telling that in reaching Michelle Carter’s guilty
verdict, Judge Moniz had to rely on a 200-year-old case,252 instead of
on any modern law that reflects new technologies and the current
attitudes toward suicide. Ultimately, Carter’s conviction represents
a judicial decision to expand the state’s suicide law by not requiring
physical presence or assistance to find the defendant guilty without
going through the proper means—the legislature.
Thomas Jefferson once asserted that,
laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of
the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed,
and manners and opinions change with the change of

249. See supra notes 147–150 and accompanying text.
250. Suicide is the tenth leading cause of death for Americans in general, and it is the

second leading cause of death for individuals specifically between ages ten and thirty-four.
See 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, United States – 2014, NAT’L CTR. FOR
INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/images/lc-charts/leading_
causes_of_death_age_group_2014_1050w760h.gif (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
251. Veronika Bondarenko, 20-Year-Old Who Repeatedly Urged Friend to Commit Suicide
Found Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2017, 11:36 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/michelle-carter-texting-suicide-guilty-conrad-roy-2017-6.
252. Glaun, supra note 22; see also Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
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circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with
the times.253

The digital world continues to change the way that people interact
and communicate with each other. Lawmakers should recognize
that there is a difference between a defendant who loads a gun and
physically places it in his suicidal wife’s hands,254 and a defendant
who is miles away, merely encouraging her boyfriend through text
messages and phone conversations to follow through with a suicide
plan the victim devised himself.
Overall, if an individual’s electronic communications may
implicate her as blameworthy for another’s suicide, this should be
clearly codified into law. The digital world is moving relentlessly
fast, and our legislation must strive to keep up. However, it is not
the role of the judiciary to set the pace.
Sierra Taylor*

253. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG,
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-samuel-kercheval/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2019).
254. See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961).
* J.D., 2019, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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